





Mark E. Levonian Have Large Banks Become Riskier?
Recent Evidence from Option Markets
Jonathan A. Neuberger Risk and Return in Banking:
Evidence from Bank Stock Returns
Number 4
Chan G. Huh Recession Probability Indexes: A Survey
Sun Bae Kim The Use of Equity Positions by Banks:
The Japanese EvidenceRecession Probability Indexes: A Survey
Chan G. Huh
I wish to thank the editorial committee, Brian Motley,
AdrianThroop, andBharatTrehan, as well as JohnJudd for
their helpful comments and Conrad Gann for his valuable
research assistance. I also wish to thank James H. Stock
and Glenn D. Rudebusch for providing data.
Specialized econometric models are designed to meas-
ure the likelihood ofthe occurrence ofa recession in the
near future. This paper examines a selected group of
models thatare distinct in terms oftheir theoretical under-
pinnings and also in terms of the scope of variables
included. The models' performanceofpredicting the onset
ofthe 1990 recession is mixed. In this case, itappears that
what distinguished the models was less the difference in
their theoretical underpinnings than whether or not the
models includedfinancial variables.
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A wide range ofmethods is used to forecast recessions.
For example, one method is a rule-of-thumb that predicts a
recession following three consecutive declines in the
Department of Commerce's composite index of leading
indicators. Atthe otherextreme are more advanced econo-
metric models. This article will focus on the latter group,
and inparticularon two advancedeconometricmodels that
represent different theoretical approaches: the experimen-
tal recession probability index (XRI) model developed by
James Stock and Mark Watson at the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER), and a turning point forecast-
ing model which implements a methodology proposed by
Salih Neftci.
The experimental NBER model is theoretically similar
to conventional linear regression models that are used for
forecasting ingeneral, although itis alsouniqueintermsof
the way information is extracted from data and in the
information the data provide. Implicit in the NBER's XRI
modelandinotherlinearforecasting modelsis the assump-
tion that expansions and contractions are partofthe same
stable structure, and that they are responses to random
shocks (policy and otherwise).
Neftci-type turning point (TP) models depart from this
key assumption of a stable structure. TP models posit
multiple behavioral regimes that govern the movements of
output over time. Thus, the process that best describes the
behaviorofoutput in anexpansionary periodis fundamen-
tally different from the process describing the behavior of
output in a contractionary period. Consequently, forecast-
ing a downturn is equivalent to predicting a switch in the
behavioral regime from an expansion to a contraction.
The recession of late 1990 provided the first out-of-
sample opportunity to apply these models. The perform-
ances ofthe models in identifying this particulardownturn
as of late 1990 were mixed, giving probabilities ranging
from 14percentto 98 percent. Interestingly, thedifferences
among the forecasts do not appear to be related to dif-
ferences in their theoretical underpinnings, but rather to
the types of variables used as the signaling source series.
The models incorporating several financial variables are
31associated with low probability forecasts, and the models
that rely mostly on nonfinancial variables result in high
prob<i.bility forecasts; th<i.t is, financial markets were, inthis
case, poor forecasters ofthe recession.
Thisresultis notdefinitive, however, andmustbeplaced
in perspective. By definition, a forecasting model of sto-
chastic outcomes cannot be expected to have a perfect fit
repeatedly. One observation hardly provides enough infor-
mationtojudgethe overall usefulnessofthemodels. Or, as
Aristotle, the father oflogic, putit, "Oneswallow does not
a summermake." Tojudgethe accuracy, andthusthe relia-
bility, ofthesemodels requires a whole series offorecasts.
Brief overviews of different models for estimating the
probabilityofeconomicdownturns areprovidedinthenext
three sections: a smndard linearregression model (Section
I), the NBER's XRI (Section II), and the Neftci turning
point forecast models (Section III). Anoverall assessment
oftheirpastwithin-sampleforecastingperformancesispro-
vided in SectionIV, and a discussion ofoutofsample per-
formance is presented in Section V. Section VIconcludes.
I. FRB San Francisco BVAR Model: A Conventional Regression Model
Oneeasy and straightforwardway to forecast arecession
is to use linear regression models designed to forecast key
macroeconomic variables. Any suchregression model can
be used to forecast a recession once the "operational"
definitionofarecession is determinedinterms ofvariables
in the model. One example is the Bayesian Vector Auto-
regression (BVAR) model used as a part of the FRB San
Francisco in-house staffforecast. 1 The BVAR is designed
to forecast growth in real GNP, inflation, and other key
macrovariables several quarters ahead. 2TheBVAR model
is specified in terms of a combination of log and level
differences of three real and seven nominal and financial
quarterly variables.3 The Bayesian prior affects this other-
wise ordinaryVAR system in the form of a priori restric-
tions on the magnitudes ofthe coefficients. For example, a
simple prior restriction that the real GNP growth rate
follows a random walk is imposed on the real GNP equa-
tion. Ofcourse, the final estimates would reflect both this
prior restriction and the sample information.
Suppose we are interested infinding the probability ofa
recession occurring within the nextthreequarters, andthat
we define a recession as two ormore consecutive quarters
of negative real GNP growth.4 The following formula
provides the necessary information to calculate the proba-
bility in period t:
(1) Prob (recession within 3 quarters) = Prob {event
(output contracts in periods t+ 1 and t+2) u event
(output contracts in periods t+ 2 and t+3) u event
(output contracts in periods t+ I, t+2, and t+3)}.
The actual calculation is in four steps. First, simulate a
large number of unconditional forecasts (e.g., 1,000) for
the next three quarters based on the model by repeatedly
drawing from the stochastic error terms of the system.
Second, count the number of simulated forecast triplets
thatfit anyoneofthethreedisjointeventsthatwere defined
in (1). Third, calculate the probability measure by dividing
the sample numbers obtained from the second step by the
total number of simulations. Fourth, the total probability
of (1) is the sum ofthe three probability measures derived
in the second step. Actual probabilities calculatedthis way
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The experimental NBER models are also based on the source of movement in all four series (for details, see
traditional regression method, and thus they share the key Sargentand Sims 1977). In term~ ofboth cyclical behavior
assumptionthatoutput series overtime canbe describedby and historical trend, Stock and Watson's CEI is very close
asingle process. However, the experimentalNBER models to the CEI released by the Commerce Department, which
(Stock andWatson 1989) are more specialized in terms of also was designed to reflect the general state of the econ-
their scope and of the econometric technique employed. omy. The main differences between the two are that Stock
The NBER XRI is based on two artificial signaling and Watson use newereconometric technology to construct
index variables that, in turn, are constructed from sets of the overall index from its components and that Stock and
actual economic variables. The signaling variables are the Watson use the employee-hours series, while the Com-
experimental indexes of coincident economic indicators merce department uses the number ofemployees.
and of leading economic indicators.5 The experimental index ofleading economic indicators
The experimental index ofcoincident economic indica- (LEI) was designed to provide optimal forecasts of the
tors (CEI) is designed to measure the level of current projected growth in the CEIover the next six months given
economic activity. It involves a weighted average of four the informationup to periodt. There are two versions ofthe
series that are widely perceived to be coincidental: indus- LEI, namely, the XLI and the XLI-2, which differ in the
trial production, real personal income less transfer pay- variables they use. The XLI uses seven variables-three
ments, real manufacturing and trade sales, and employee- real and four nominal and financial variables-that were
hours in nonagricultural establishments. The index is selected after applying multiple sets of tests to a large
based on a dynamic factor model that measures the change number of candidate variables. The XLI-2 replaces all
in an unobserved factor that is assumed to be a significant nominal and financial variables used in the XLI, exceptthe
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 33exchange rate, with additional real variables. (See Table 1
for the listofvariables. Foradetailedeconometric descrip-
tion, see Stock and Watson (1989) or Watson (1991,
Appendix).)
Two relatedexperimentalrecession indexes arebasedon
these models, the XRI and the XRI-2. These indexes are
designed to measure the probability that the economy
(gauged by the CEl) will be in a recession six months
hence.6 Actual probabilities using a stochastic simulation
methodthatis similartotheproceduredescribedin Section
I for XRI and XRI-2 are presented in Charts 2 and 3,
respectively.
This procedureis validunderakey assumptionoflinear-
ity in the relationship between the variables involved. That
is, the underlying model that describes the behavioral
relationship betweenreal GNP (orany variable ofinterest)
and its explanatory variables must remain stable and sym-
metric across bothexpansionary andcontractionary phases
ofbusiness cycles. Ifthis linearrelationship does not hold,
one has to consider some alternative ways to describe the
behavioral relationship. Subsequently, calculating the
probabilities of the events defined in (1) would become
more involved.
Indeed, some economists thinkthatthere are fundamen-
tal differences in the behavioral patterns ofkey variables
across expansion phases and contraction phases of busi-
ness cycles. We now turn to a specializedrecession proba-
bility model that is based on such a view.
Chart 2
NBER Recession Index (XRI)
Chart 3


























Economic Review / Fall 1991III. Turning Point Recession Index: Process Switching Model
Many economists have observed asymmetric behavior The next step is to take the first difference ofthe series.
ofsomekey macro variables betweeneconomic expansions Then the datacharacteristics in upturns and downturns are
andcontractions. For example, outputtends to inch upward summarized by fitting simple normal distribution func-
during an expansion, butittends to drop very sharply atthe tions: first divide the overall historical period into expan-
beginning of a contraction. Thus, the behavior of the sionary and contractionary sub-periods using the historical
economy in the two phases is best described as being turning point dating in the DOC LI series. Then the DOC
governedby two distinct stochastic structures instead ofby LI observations belonging to expansionary and contrac-
a single underlying structure (Neftci 1982). Consequently, tionary periods are respectively pooled into two groups of
accordingtothese views, forecasting arecession (the onset upturn and downturn samples. Finally, two normal dis-
ofacontractionregime) amounts to predicting abehavioral tribution functions Ne(fLe'(J'e)' Ne(fLe'(J'c) (where fL and (J'
switch in the economy from an expansion to acontraction. denote the mean and standard deviation) are estimated
To putthis idea into practice, a forecaster needs asignal from the expansion and contraction samples, respectively.
variable that foretells changes in the behavioral structures. Additionally, determine a prior transitional probability
This signal variable must meet several requirements: its for the signal variable. The transitional probabilityn is the
behavior should be systematically related to that of the measure of the likelihood that the signal variable will
output in the economy; it should have some lead time with remain in the current regime at any given time. 7 Conse-
respect to changes in output to be useful as a predictor of quently, 1- n measures the probability of the signal vari-
changes in output; finally, it should be available frequently able switching from the current behavioral regime.
enough to update the model in a timely manner in terms of Given this information, one can apply the switching
key developments that have a bearing on the potential shift time Bayesian probability formula that was developed by
in the regime. Both the original turning point model of Neftci (1982) as shown in Box 1. With each new observa-
Neftci (1982) and a model by Diebold and Rudebusch tion in the DOC LI, the turning point recession index
(1989) use the monthly Composite Index of Leading In- (TPRI) model calculates the conditional probability that
dicators published by the Department of Commerce the indicator is in the downturn regime. The probabilities
(henceforth, DOC LI) as such a signal variable. are shown in Chart 4.
Chart 4
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IV. Assessment
Recession probability indexes and turning point models
are more sophisticated than rule-of-thumb methods, which
typically forecast a recession after three consecutive de-
clines in the DOC LI. They are also more systematic
because they account for the magnitude ofchange as well
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
as the temporal direction of change in the leading indica-
tors, and in general, they substantiallyoutperformthe rule-
of-thumb predictions.
Stock and Watson (1989, pp. 382) applied a formal
econometric method to compare the predictive power of
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the rule-of-thumb method and their method, and found
their method to be more accurate. They performed regres-
sion analyses that related consecutive movements in the
DOCLInumbers to actualhistorical recessions andexpan-
sions. Forexample, theR2 ofthe regression thatrelated the
index to the occurrence of recessions or expansions six
months hence was 0.028 using the rule-of-thumb, whereas
it was 0.50 for the regression using the experimental
NBER XRI. Diebold and Rudebusch (1989) also found a
similar relative performance ranking ofthe rule-of-thumb
method compared to different methods, such as the Neftci
method.8
However, assessing the"goodness offit" ofthese mod-
els is conceptually difficult, because their forecasts are in
terms of probabilities, and "actual" probabilities are not
directly observable to evaluate the performance of these
models. In fact, low probability recessions may occasion-
allyoccur, while highprobabilityrecessions may occasion-
ally not occur. Thus, over a limited sample period, simply
correlating the probability with the business cycle is not
necessarily agoodway tojudgethe accuracyofthe models.
Ofcourse, the largerthe sample, the more appropriate this
direct type ofevaluation becomes.9
Onecriterion that is often used to gauge reliability is the
frequency offalse signals, a notorious problem for leading
indicators that led to Paul Samuelson's, famous remark,
"The stock market has predicted nine out of the last five
recessions!" The first type of false signal is analogous to
the Type II error of the usual hypothesis test; that is, the
model forecast ofan imminentrecession is not followed by
an actual recession within a reasonable period oftime. For
example, suppose we interpret a model as signaling a
recession when the probability is above half of the max-
imum probability (observed over the sample period) of
each model. According to this criterion, the TPRI and
NBER XRI-2 models each have two instances of false
signals for the 1968-1989 sample period (1985 and 1988 for
TPRI and 1988 and 1989 for XRI-2); the very striking
spikes in the TPRI model in the late 1980s seem to have
beenreflecting temporary slowdowns inthe manufacturing
sectorduring those periods. TheNBER XRIand BVAR RI
have no false signals.
The secondtypeoffalse signal is analogous to the Type I
errorofthe usual hypothesis test; that is, the model fails to
predict an ensuing recession with some lead time (for
example, six months). Using the same cut-off probability
as in the first case, the NBER XRI-2 has failed four times
(1969, 1973, 1980 and 1982), the TPRI model has failed
twice (1974 and1981), the BVARRIhasfailedonce (1969),
Economic Review / Fall 1991and the NBER XRI has not failed at all. The performance
ofthe TPRI in this regard is most likely related to the fact
thatitis basedonthe DOCLIwhichis notorious for having
widely varying lead times with the business cycle peaks
and troughs. For the past 30 years, for example, turning
points in the DOC LI have led the contractionary turning
points of the economy by anywhere from two to twenty
months.10
VI. Recent Predictions
As in any of the forecasting models that have been
estimated using sample information, an important test of
the RPI models' forecasting power hinges on their out-of-
sample performance. The only out-of-sample observation
we have is the most recent recession, which started in the
second halfof1990.
The models' various predictions ofthe probability ofan
imminentrecession as ofthe endofNovember 1990 are 14
percent for the NBER XRI, 21 percent for the BVAR, 53
percentfor theNBERXRI-2, and98 percentfor the TPRI.
The sharp divergence between the forecasts ofthe NBER
XRI and XRI-2 suggests that different theoretical under-
pinnings alone do not explain the divergent forecasts. It is
natural to ask, then, what the most likely source of such
differences is.
One distinguishing feature is that low probability fore-
casts includeda setoffinancial variables (interestrates and
associated spreads) but high probability forecasts did not.
This is particularly interesting in light ofrecent studies on
the changing role of financial variables in econometric
models ofkey macro variables.
Bernanke (1990), among others, found that various in-
terest rates and spreads were substantially more useful in
explaining and forecasting key macro variables for the
pre-1980 sample period than for the post~1980 period. In
particular, he examined the spread between the commer-
cial paper rate and the T-bill rate. This spread may reflect
the defaultriskofcommercialpaper, which, inturn, would
be very sensitive to an expectedrecession. However, ifthis
is the important channel through which the financial vari-
ables are useful in forecasting key variables, then they still
can be expected to have substantial explanatory power in
econometric models.
The spread may also reflect the monetary policy stance,
which affects the near-termeconomic condition by shifting
credit conditions. This may be particularly relevant when
there are deposit interest rate ceilings and when commer-
cial paper andT-bills are imperfect substitutes as portfolio
assets. Monetary tightening would induce an outflow of
deposits from banks as market interestrates rise above de-
posit ceilings. This "disintermediation" creates a "credit
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
crunch" andsubsequently aneconomic contraction. Atthe
same·time, bank deposits will flow into T-bills because
T-bills canbepurchasedinrelatively small denominations,
unlike commercial paper, which is typically in denomina-
tions too large for most small deposit holders. This inflow
offunds will depress T-biIl yields relative to commercial
paper rates in periods when the general level of interest
rates is higher. 11
According to this hypothesis, it is relatively easy to
explain the diminished role ofthe spread. Since the early
1980s when deposit rates were deregulated, more alterna-
tivefinancial assets have become available creating closer
substitutability among assets.
This conjecture seems relevant in explaining the diver-
gent forecasts of the various models. The yield curve has
maintained a positive slope, and few noticeable changes
withrespectto short-terminterestrates and therate-spread
have occurredinlate 1990. Thus, the recession forecasts of
models that included these financial variables might have
picked up mixed signals of the likely conditions of the
economy, unlike the models with only real variables.
Consequently, according to this conjecture, the probability
of recession forecasted by models containing financial
variables did not increase as substantially as it did in
models relying entirely on real variables.
It is quite possible that the current recession is distinct
from preceding ones in terms of both its causes and the
way contractionary effects of the causal factors spread
across the economy. Forexample, some economistscitethe
diminished credit availability which started in 1990 for
reasons related to the weakened condition of financial
institutions and stricter regulations while others point to
the special circumstances associated with the Middle East
confrontation, which increased short-term and near-term
uncertainties.
The question of whether business cycles are distinct
(andhence whether a single modeling strategy is appropri-
ate) is notnew. BlanchardandWatson (1986) examinedthe
nature of the sources of impulses behind business cycles
using U.S. time series data. Their findings suggest that
cycles are not alike; that is, each historical cycle can be
37associated with several identifiable large single shocks
with different origins.
This result, however, does not necessarily make the
modeling approaches surveyed here inappropriate. The
existing models are still valid and applicable to the de-
signedtaskifthere exist measurable similarities in the way
the original shocks propagate or dissipate throughout the
economy. Whether or not this is the case is an important
empirical issue, one on Which we can expect to see more
research in the future.
VII. Conclusion
Representative models designed to forecast prospectsof
arecession in the nearfuture have beenexamined. Specifi-
cally reviewedwerethe experimental NBERindex models
and a model based on the Neftci method. They differ not
only in vari(}US operational aspects, but also in their
conceptual approaches to modeling the behavior of key
economic variables, such as output. The experimental
NBER models are based on the assumption that output
behaves symmetrically across both expansionary and con-
tractionary phases ofeconomic fluctuations, whereas the
Neftci method admits a shift in the behavioral regime
across the two phases. Whether this assumption ofa sym-
metry in the behaviorofthe outputis empirically appropri-
ate is an issue currently being examined by economists.
The models performed well in terms of within-sample
historical predictions. They outperformed the common
rule-of-thumb that relies on three consecutive declines in
the DOC LI. However, their out-of-sample forecasts were
widely divergent, even for those that used the same model-
ing approach. The distinction is that models with a high
probability forecast .excluded a set of financial variables
while low probability forecasts included financial vari-
abIes. This seems to reflect the fact that a recession is
defined to bea periodofcontractionsin real variables such
as orders, sales, output and employment. Although the
amount ofthe lead time may vary, models that rely com-
prehensively on such real variables will necessarily pro-
vide indications of the onset ofa serious downturn.
Itis likely thatthe most recent downturn was unusual in
thatits causal factors differed from the few factors that had
frequently been behind past recessions. In that sense, the
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modelsthatweredesigned to conform to the general aver-
age •• characteristics of past economic fluctuations did
poorly in detecting the most recent economic downturn.
However, it is premature to draw any inferences from
this·single-sample observation of the current recession;
these results need to be considered in the properperspec-
tive. In most situations where we need to draw inferences
about an uncertain outcome, more informationis preferred
tolessasapractical principle. This holds true with regard
to forecasting business cycle downturns, especially since
we do not have a well-understood, widely agreed upon,
and operationallyfeasible framework for describing evolu-
tions of a large set ofmacro variables.
Such a framework could provide a theoretically well-
founded list ofvariables or a sequence ofeconomic events
that could give rise to a "sufficient statistic" about a near-
term economic downturn, and would covsequently make
any additional information redundant. In this context,
systematic efforts to reduce ourpredictionerrors involving
important aggregate economic variables such as the RPI
models can be useful.
The key contributionoftheRPI models, however, essen-
tially lies in providing another way to organize and use
information contained in the various leading economic
indicators. Consequently, their reliability is crucially
dependent on the reliability of the leading economic in-
dicators that are used as the sources ofinformation. Thus,
any further refinement and improvement of our stock of
knowledge on leading indicators will lead to commensu-
rate improvement in the performance of the recession
forecasting models.
Economic Review I Fall 1991ENDNOTES
1. For detailed explanations of this modeling strategy, see
Todd (1984) and Roberds (1988). For a more theoretical
discussion of this econometric methodology see Doan,
Litterman and Sims (1984).
2. This is done by weighing forecast accuracy at the one-
year horizon more heavily than the rest of the forecasting
horizon. This step is implemented during a model speci-
fication selection stage. Following .the BVAR modeling
practice, a model builder definesapriormatrixofparam-
eters that control the dynamic interactions between vari-
ables .in each equation of the model. We adjusted these
prior parameters selectively to obtain the forecast ac-
curacy configuration across different forecasting time
frames. See Roberds (1988) for detailed descriptions.
3. The variables are real GNP, business fixed investment,
the unemployment rate, fixed GNP price index, unit la-
bor cost, producer price index, monetary aggregate M2,
trade weighted exchange rate,six~month commercial pa-
per, and AAA corporate rates.
4. Applying this rule to post-war U.S. data (194701-
199003) we detect six out of the eight recessions that
occurred.
5. These indexes were developed as the result of efforts to
updatethe system of indicators that were developed in the
1930s and 1940s at the NBER by Mitchell and others; the
latter is still being used at the Department of Commerce.
6. This particular time horizon is related to theway the LEI
is constructed. That is, it was specifically designed to give
an optimal forecast of the CEI's relative growth over six
months. A more precise definition ofthe economy being in
a recession is as follows: A month is defined to be in a
recession pattern if the monthly growth of the CEI index is
either in a sequence of six consecutive declines below a
boundary point, or in a sequence of nine declines below
the boundary with no more than one increase during the
middle seven months.
7. There are different views regarding the question of
dependency between the duration of each phase (i.e., ex-
pansionary or contractionary) and the probability of tran-
sition from one regime to another. For example, in Neftci
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
(1982), the transition probability is treated as dependent
on the duration, whereas Diebold and Rudebusch (1989)
use a transitional probability matrixthat is independentof
the duration. For more details on this issue, see Hamilton
(1989), Neftci (1984), Diebold and Rudebusch (1990).
8. However, a recent study by Koenig and Emery (1991)
found that some relatively simple methods similar to the
rule of thumb did as well as the Neftci method when the
actual· real lime data that would historically have been
available to a forecaster were used, instead of the most
recent revised data on the DOC L1. These results point to
some potential problems with the DOC LI series, which
has.gone through major revisions, rather than..toa .de-
valuation of the Neftci methodology.
9. Diebold and Rudebusch (1989) propose and examine
a set of test statistics that can score a probability forecast
model in terms of different attributes such as accuracy,
calibration and resolution. Even though these proposed
methods are systematic, small-sample observations are
still problematic. However, the turning point forecast mod-
el seems more appropriate for such an evaluation method,
because it generates more observations both in terms
of switches from expansions to contractions and vice
versa, whereas a simple recession forecast model would
count only switches from expansionary to contractionary
regimes.
10. Koenig and Emery (1991) give a detail account of the
relative performance of the real time DOC LI series in
predicting expansions versus contractions. They find the
series to be a better predictorof expansions and a poorer
predictor of recessions in near future.
11. Financial institutions would have an opportunity to
arbitrage by selling T-bills in their portfolio and buying
commercial paper in those periods. However, for banks
those two instruments are not alike. For example, banks
can use T-bills but not commercial paper as collateral for
satisfying bank capital adequacy. Thus, dueto the imper-
fect substitutability between T-bills and commercial pa-
per, banks will not arbitrage and offset the widening
spread.
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